The aggravation of the situation around the final settlement of the Karabakh conflict was expected, and this was already discussed at the stage of completion of the Second Karabakh War in November 2020.
The protests of the Armenian opposition against the peace agreement with Azerbaijan without recognizing the independence of the Armenian-populated territory of Karabakh (APTK) that engulfed the media, parliament and streets, cannot be regarded as some kind of internal political collision of the struggle for power.
The struggle for power in one form or another is a natural political process in any state, but not in this case. The history of the Karabakh conflict suggests that regardless of who is in power in Armenia, the issue of the independence of the APTK is resolved and is not subject to discussion. In principle, it can be discussed, but nothing more. In the same way, in Azerbaijan, the issue of independence of the APTK has not been considered and is not being considered under any regime, and, just like in Armenia, it has the status of a public consensus: Karabakh is Azerbaijan.
In fact, since the signing the trilateral (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia) Declaration on a ceasefire on November 9-10, 2020, its important points have not been practically implemented, including the withdrawal of the Armenian Armed Forces from the zone of responsibility of Russian peacekeepers, the opening of communications, the delimitation and demarcation of the state border between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia, which has assumed mediating responsibility, is not showing much zeal in this matter.
All points of implementation of the provisions of the Statement are being delayed by Armenia, which already after the end of the war put forward a precondition for discussing the status of the APTK, where this territory was considered as independent from Azerbaijan or, in the worst case, an international mandated territory. Such statements were made by official circles. After the meetings of the parties and the activity of the mediators, which began this year and increased in amplitude, official Yerevan expressed its readiness for a status within Azerbaijan. It is from this moment, and especially after the April meetings of the leaders of both countries in Brussels and Moscow, that the opposition, resembling a Phoenix bird reborn from the ashes, goes on the offensive with demands for Pashinyan’s resignation and the actual denunciation of the Statement of November 9-10, 2020.
It would not be correct to adhere to the opinion that there are differences between the authorities and the opposition in Armenia regarding the independence of the APTK. It would be more correct to view the situation as a kind of Armenian consensus and admit that this is exactly what we are dealing with, and not deceive ourselves with some kind of split in the Armenian society.
But we must also recognize that the danger to the peace process does not come from a consensus, even an implicit one, between the authorities and the opposition. Armenia and Azerbaijan lived within their national consensus on Karabakh. The danger lies in an attempt to once again involve external forces in the struggle for Karabakh. After all, it must be admitted that the aggravation in Armenia and unprecedented protest activity surged not only in connection with the intensification of the negotiation process, but also the events around Ukraine, namely after the start of Russian aggression.
This event can be called the same geopolitical rift that was so hoped for in Yerevan after the end of the Second Karabakh War. If we look at the reaction of the Armenian community in Armenia and Russia, it was somewhat restrained and expectant after the first failures of the Russian army. But as Ukrainian resistance grew, foreign aid and international anti-Russian consolidation grew, and the Putin regime weakened, radical pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian statements began to grow. There were staged actions in support of Z, Armenian mouthpieces in Yerevan and in the Russian information space became radicalized, such as the director of Mosfilm Karen Shakhnazarov, the head of RT Margarita Simonyan, the producer Tigran Kesoyan.
Given the good awareness of the Armenian elite about the ongoing processes in the political corridors of various countries, these actions may indirectly indicate that the Armenian establishment has already really set in motion, relying on some expected changes on the captain’s bridge in Russia, which can be called post-Putin time. Putin, as you know, was a co-author of the results of the Karabakh war, and the Armenian society developed a corresponding attitude towards him – as an unacceptable partner in the struggle between Armenia and Azerbaijan for Karabakh.
It should be noted that today Putin has two opponents in his own camp – this is a defeated oligarchy, an army embittered by a series of defeats and a disoriented special service.
As in previous times of geopolitical kinks that catalyze the Karabakh conflict, the Armenian bet can be, or rather is made, both on representatives of soft power and a strong hand.
As you know, the Armenian movement for Karabakh began during perestroika, which was based on the theses of Gorbachev and the need for change, as well as on the defenders of the anachronisms of the past, advocating the preservation of the empire. The second, already military phase of this struggle began immediately after the failure of the August coup in Russia in 1991, and also relied on the political support of representatives of soft power in the person of Yeltsin’s associates and the firm hand of the KGB-army coalition, performed by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Pavel Grachev. In both cases, the Armenian policy towards Karabakh was successful.
As then, Russia is on the verge of change. Armenia is waiting for revenge. Azerbaijan?
Source: Turan News Agency