Azerbaijan’s Gold Export Surge Explained: No Russian Connection

Baku: Russian economic commentator Vyacheslav Shiryayev recently stirred controversy with claims on the 'DW ?? ???????' platform that Azerbaijan is acting as a middleman in funneling sanctioned Russian gold to Western markets. He pointed out that while Azerbaijan's annual gold production is about 3 tons, the country exported 24.2 tons of gold in the first half of 2026, suggesting a suspicious discrepancy.

According to Azeri-Press News Agency, the comparison made by Shiryayev lacks a comprehensive understanding of Azerbaijan's gold reserves and investments. Azerbaijan's State Oil Fund (SOFAZ) has been investing in physical gold since 2012, progressively increasing its portfolio allocation to gold, which reached 35% by 2026. Over the past two years, SOFAZ accelerated its gold purchases, amassing 44.8 tons in 2024 and 53.4 tons in 2025, leading to a reserve of 200 tons of gold by early 2026.

The rise in global gold prices further influenced the situation. Gold prices soared from approximately $1,800 per ounce in 2022 to an all-time high of $5,594.82 per ounce in January 2026. This price surge increased the value and portfolio share of SOFAZ's gold holdings, prompting the Fund to sell 21.9 tons of gold in the first quarter of 2026 to rebalance its portfolio.

Matching these figures, 21.902 tons of the 24.2 tons exported by Azerbaijan were shipped to the United Kingdom, aligning closely with the amount sold by SOFAZ. Customs statistics support that the exported gold was indeed that sold by SOFAZ, providing a documented explanation for the export numbers.

Shiryayev's claim of Azerbaijan re-exporting Russian gold lacks evidence in foreign trade statistics. In the first half of 2026, Azerbaijan's gold imports were a mere 91.5 kilograms, with no imports recorded from Russia. This absence of data on large-scale gold imports from Russia undermines the assertion of Azerbaijan facilitating Russian gold exports.

The commentary draws a parallel with Armenia, which in 2024 imported 84.5 tons of gold from Russia and exported 77.5 tons, a process clearly documented in trade statistics. Such transparency is absent in Azerbaijan's case, weakening Shiryayev's claims.

Deutsche Welle's platform, which published Shiryayev's allegations, is urged to verify facts thoroughly. SOFAZ's gold reserves, sales figures, and the lack of evidence of Russian gold imports are publicly available and should have been considered. Journalism demands balanced reporting and fact-checking, which appears lacking in this instance.

Ultimately, the responsibility to substantiate Shiryayev's claims lies with him. The documented data points to a straightforward explanation for Azerbaijan's gold exports, diverging from the narrative of a Russian gold conduit. Those asserting otherwise bear the burden of proof.